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NOT YET GONE, AND NOT YET
FORGOTTEN: THE REASONABLENESS OF
CONTINUED MANDATORY DETENTION OF
NONCITIZENS WITHOUT A BOND
HEARING
MIRIAM PEGUERO MEDRANO*
Section 1226(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) authorizes the mandatory detention, without the
possibility of bond, of noncitizens convicted of certain qualifying offenses for
the duration of their removal proceedings. Congress enacted the mandatory
detention statute because it was concerned that noncitizens who are convicted of crimes will further engage in criminal activity and fail to appear for
their removal hearings. To ensure noncitizens are not deprived of their constitutional right to due process, federal courts have construed § 1226(c) to
contain an implicit time limitation against unreasonably prolonged detention. These courts have adopted either a bright-line or case-by-case approach to determine the point at which mandatory detention without bond
becomes unconstitutionally impermissible. After six months of detention, the
former requires an automatic bond hearing and the latter instructs detainees
to file a habeas corpus petition that, if granted, triggers a bond hearing.
This year, the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez rejected the
lower courts’ construction § 1226(c) and held that interpreting § 1226(c) to
contain an implicit time limitation is improper because the statute is neither
ambiguous or unclear. The Court, however, declined to consider whether its
interpretation of § 1226(c) is constitutional and instead remanded the case
back to the Ninth Circuit to consider constitutional arguments on the merits.
* B.A., Monmouth University, 2013; J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker School
of Law, 2018. This Comment is dedicated to all immigrants, like my family and me, who have
come to America for the opportunity of a better life—the American Dream. I would like to
also thank my family and friends for their endless support and encouragement of my Dream
to pursue a law degree, and all the editors of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
for their hard work and dedication in editing this piece.
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This Comment argues that the majority’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez failed to enforce the Constitution and protect the due process rights of
detained noncitizens by interpreting § 1226(c) as not having a time limit on
detention without bond. It further contends that while the lower courts correctly interpreted § 1226(c) to include a time limit, the current approaches
applied by these courts do not properly protect detainees’ constitutional
rights because under both approaches, detainees cannot challenge the reasonableness of their continued detention until after six months. Limiting detainees’ opportunity to challenge their continued detention for six months
raises the same “serious doubts” of constitutionality that Justice Breyer argued, in dissent, are raised when § 1226(c) is interpreted as forbidding an
individualized bond hearing. Alternatively, this Comment proposes that detained noncitizens—who pose little risk of flight or danger to the community—should receive prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action
as to their continued detention at any point during their detention, including
during the “presumptively reasonable” six-month period under the current
two approaches. If prosecutorial discretion is not granted, detained noncitizens should then be entitled to automatic and periodic bond hearings beginning at six months of detention.
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INTRODUCTION
I like to share the story of Mr. Warren Hilarion Joseph. Mr. Joseph migrated to the United States when he was twenty-one as a legal permanent
resident inspired by the American Dream.1 Today, Mr. Joseph is a U.S. citizen, a U.S. Gulf War veteran, a father to U.S.-born children, and a former
legal permanent resident who was detained for three and a half years in immigration detention for committing minor, nonviolent offenses.2
Shortly after arriving in the United States at the age of twenty-one, Mr.
Joseph enlisted in the U.S. Army and served in combat positions in the First
Gulf War until he was honorably discharged for injuries suffered in the line
1

See Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5–7, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016) [hereinafter Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice et al.]
2
Mr. Joseph’s story is among the many made available by the Prolonged Detention Stories online platform, a joint project of Community Initiatives for Visiting Immigrants in Confinement (CIVIC) and the Immigrant Rights Clinic at NYU Law. In an effort to underscore
the devastating impact of prolonged mandatory detention, CIVIC and NYU Law created this
platform for immigrants to share their stories. Some of these stories were included in an amicus brief in support of Respondents in the case Jennings v. Rodriguez. See The Brief,
PROLONGED DETENTION STORIES, https://www.prolongeddetentionstories.org/#the-brief (last
visited Dec. 25, 2017). The facts of Mr. Joseph’s case are also detailed in his habeas petition,
see Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Joseph v. Aviles, No. 2:07-cv-02392-JLL (D.N.J. May
11, 2007).
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of duty.3 Like many veterans, Mr. Joseph had a hard time readjusting to society and was arrested in 2001 for illegally purchasing a handgun for people
to whom he owed money.4 While completing his probation sentence, he forgot to inform his probation officer that he had relocated to his mother’s house
and was subsequently sentenced to six months in prison for violating his probation.5
Upon release, Mr. Joseph was civilly detained in immigration detention
because he qualified as a noncitizen who committed an offense that triggers
the mandatory detention mandate under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).6
Section 1226(c) mandates the detention without bond of noncitizens who
have committed qualifying crimes for the duration of their removal proceedings.7
For three and a half years, Mr. Joseph was separated from his children
and family members, was subjected to horrific jail conditions, and his wartime injuries worsened, requiring surgery and causing permanent difficulty
walking.8 At no point during Mr. Joseph’s mandatory detention was his confinement necessary to prevent flight or danger to the community. To the
contrary, Mr. Joseph had strong familial and community values and had
served in the U.S. military. His two crimes were both minor and non-violent,
one of which was a violation of his probation for forgetting to inform his
probation officer that he had relocated. Nevertheless, Mr. Joseph was detained during his removal proceedings for a staggering three and a half years
until he won his case to remain in the United States and was finally released
to his family.9
Sadly, Mr. Joseph’s story is not uncommon.10 Every year, unnecessary
and widespread immigration detention pursuant to § 1226(c) tears thousands
of families apart, many of which are comprised of U.S. citizens and legal
permanent residents, and imprisons people who have a long history of living
3

See Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice et al., supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 6.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 6–7; see also Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)); Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) of 1952 § 236(c).
7
See generally Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)).
8
See Brief for Americans for Immigrant Justice et al., supra note 1, at 7.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 5–12 (noting that “[p]eople like Mr. Joseph . . . are not unique within our immigration system. For removal cases that are not resolved quickly, it is not uncommon for administrative proceedings to last years, and for individuals to win their cases.”).
4
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in the United States, prior legal immigration status, and only minor, nonviolent criminal convictions.11
In the landmark case Demore v. Kim, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of § 1226(c)’s detention mandate, reasoning that Congress
has the authority to detain noncitizens for the brief period of their removal
proceedings to prevent the risk of flight and dangerousness.12 Today, because
removal proceedings are no longer brief and often prolonged,13 federal courts
have construed § 1226(c) as having a time limit on prolonged detention without bond, relying heavily on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
Demore, which aptly cautioned that due process rights of noncitizens may
preclude mandatory detention without bond if detention becomes unreasonably prolonged or no longer reasonably related “to the purpose for which the
individual was committed.”14 Federal courts have applied either a brightline, six-month rule or a case-by-case approach to determine at what point
detention without bond is unconstitutionally prolonged. Of the six circuit
courts that have addressed this issue, the Second and Ninth Circuits have
adopted a bright-line, six-month rule where noncitizens are automatically entitled to periodic bond hearings upon completing six months of detention.15
The First, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a case-by-case
approach, whereby detained noncitizens may file a petition for a writ of ha-

11

See, e.g., Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes,
Record Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/more-deportations-follow-minor-crimes-data-shows.html (explaining that while the Obama administration “took steps it portrayed as narrowing the focus of enforcement efforts on criminal
aliens . . . the records show that the enforcement net actually grew, picking up more and more
immigrants with minor or no criminal records”); Teresa Wiltz, What Crimes Are Eligible for
Deportation?, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/12/21/what-crimes-are-eligible-for-deportation
(noting that a great number of noncitizens classified as “criminal aliens” under § 1226(c) are
being deported for minor, nonviolent offenses, such as misdemeanors, probation violations,
petty theft, and shoplifting).
12
See generally 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
13

Prerna Lal, Legal and Extra-Legal Challenges to Immigrant Detention, 24 ASIAN AM.
L.J. 131, 138 (2017) (noting that after Demore “courts were presented with cases involving
noncitizens who had been held in custody for periods far in excess” than the period the Court
found reasonable”).
14
See Demore, 538 U.S. at 532–33 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Due Process—Immigration Detention—Third Circuit Holds that the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Authorizes Immigration Detention Only for a “Reasonable Period of Time.”—Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011), 125
HARV. L. REV. 1522, 1522 (2012) [hereinafter Due Process—Immigration Detention].
15
See, e.g., Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d Cir. 2015); Rodriguez v. Robbins,
804 F.3d 1060, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015).
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beas corpus, at which point a federal court will examine the individual circumstances of each case to determine whether to grant the petition that then
triggers an individualized bond hearing.16
Since the Court’s decision in Demore, § 1226(c) has resulted in the prolonged detention of numerous noncitizens who have committed crimes that
fall under § 1226(c)’s list of broad offenses. The latest data demonstrates
that there are currently 632,261 pending immigration cases across the United
States, and the average length of time a pending case takes to conclude is 681
days or 22 months.17 The current average wait time for a case to conclude
has significantly increased from previous years. For example, in 2016, “open
cases in U.S. Immigration Court [had] been waiting for an average of 667
days . . . . This [was] 3.7 [%] longer than the 643 days average wait time at
the end of FY 2015 (September 2015) and is 17.6 [%] higher than it was at
the end of FY 2014.”18 Furthermore, many of these detained noncitizens have
only committed minor, nonviolent offenses, have strong familial ties to family members in the U.S. who are legal permanent residents and citizens that
need their support, and are likely to prevail in winning some form of relief
because of their strong mitigating equities.19 As a result, prolonged detention
without bond has encouraged many detained noncitizens just like Mr. Joseph
to challenge the constitutionality of their prolonged mandatory detention.
This year, the Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez rejected the
lower courts’ construction of § 1226(c) and held that interpreting § 1226(c)
to contain an implicit temporal limit is improper because the statute is neither
ambiguous or unclear.20 The Court, however, declined to consider whether
its strict interpretation of § 1226(c) raises constitutional doubts and instead
remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to consider those constitutional
arguments on the merits.21 Justice Breyer, on the other hand, delivered a
16

See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 496 (1st Cir. 2016); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 231–33 (3d
Cir. 2011); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 271–73 (6th Cir. 2003).
17
Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/court_backlog/ (last visited May 16, 2018); Dana Leigh Marks, Snapshot of the
Crisis Facing Our Immigration Courts Today: Salient Facts and Urgent Needs, NAT’L ASS’N
OF IMMIGR. JUDGES (Oct. 2006), http://naij-usa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NAIJ
-Snapshot-October-2015.pdf.
18
TRAC, Average Wait Time in Immigration Court Rises to 667 Days: TRAC,
LESIXNEXIS NEWSROOM: IMMIGR. L. (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.lexisnexis.com/
legalnewsroom/immigration/b/outsidenews/archive/2016/02/12/average-wait-time-in-immigration-court-rises-to-667-days-trac.aspx.
19
See Lal, supra note 13, at 133.
20

See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).

21

Id. at 851 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n.7 (2005)).
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passionate dissent and argued that the majority’s interpretation of § 1226(c)
renders the statute unconstitutional because the relevant constitutional language, purpose, history, traditions, context, and case law altogether demonstrate that when confinement is prolonged, even immigration civil confinement, bond hearings are constitutionally required.22
This Comment argues that the majority’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez failed to enforce the Constitution and protect the due process rights of
detained noncitizens by interpreting § 1226(c) as not having a time limit detention without bond. Federal courts that are given the opportunity to decide
on the constitutional question should hold, as they have held, that § 1226(c)
is unconstitutional unless read to include a time limit on indefinite detention
without bond. This Comment also contends that while the lower courts correctly interpreted § 1226(c) to include a time limit, the approaches adopted
by these federal courts to determine the time limit do not properly protect
detained noncitizens’ due process rights. Under both approaches, detention
without bond is presumed constitutional for at least six months. This is true
even for detained noncitizens who have meritorious defenses and strong mitigating equities, such as community and familial ties, distinguished military
service, and prior legal immigration status. Limiting detainees’ opportunity
to challenge their continued detention for six months raises the same issues
of constitutionality that Justice Breyer argued are raised when § 1226(c) is
interpreted as forbidding an individualized bond hearing. Alternatively, this
Comment proposes that detained noncitizens—who pose little risk of flight
or danger to the community—should receive prosecutorial discretion in the
form of deferred action as to their continued detention at any point during
their detention, including during the current approaches’ presumptively reasonable six-month period.
Part I outlines the constitutional principle of due process as well as the
relevant statutory framework of § 1226(c)’s detention mandate.23 Part II discusses the Supreme Court cases that have considered the constitutionality of
mandatory detention, and argues that the Court’s decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez was wrongly decided because § 1226(c) should be read to contain an
implicit time limitation on prolonged detention without bond. This part also
examines, through case precedent, the approaches applied by the circuit
courts in determining the time limit of mandatory detention without bond.24
Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that neither approach adopted by the

22
23
24

Id. at 861 (Breyer J., dissenting).
See infra discussion Part I and accompanying notes.
See infra discussion Part II and accompanying notes.
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circuit courts properly balances detainees’ liberty interest against the government’s interest in preventing flight and dangerousness.25 This Part instead
proposes that detained noncitizens—who are neither a flight risk nor a danger
to the community—should be given prosecutorial discretion in the form of
deferred action as to their continued mandatory detention at any point after
being detained.26 If an applicant is denied prosecutorial discretion, he or she
should then be entitled to automatic and periodic bond hearings beginning
after six months of detention.27
I. DUE PROCESS AND THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C)
DETENTION MANDATE
Although Congress has plenary power over matters of immigration policy, Congress’s power is limited by the Constitution.28 In resolving issues of
mandatory detention of noncitizens, it is thus important to understand what
constitutional rights are provided to noncitizens and how they are balanced
against the statutory framework currently in place.
A. DUE PROCESS

Not all classes of persons are afforded identical constitutional rights—
the Constitution explicitly reserves different rights for “natural born Citizens,” “Citizens,” and “Persons.”29 For example, the right to vote30 or to run
for federal elective office31 is explicitly reserved for Citizens, while the right
to run for President of the United States is reserved for natural-born Citizens.32 Moreover, in regulating immigration, “Congress regularly makes
25

See infra discussion Section III.A and accompanying notes.

26

See infra discussion Section III.B and accompanying notes.

27

See infra discussion Section III.B and accompanying notes.
28
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001) (noting that “Congress has plenary power to create immigration law . . . ”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
713 (1893) (“The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international
relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by
treaty or by act of congress . . .”); see also Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note
14, at 1523 (“The 123-year-old plenary power doctrine, first enunciated in the so-called Chinese Exclusion Case, affords Congress ‘virtually unlimited’ power to set immigration policy.”)
(emphasis omitted).
29
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury . . .”); see also The Honorable Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the
Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 806 (2013).
30
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
31
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
32
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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rules that would be unacceptable if applied to Citizens.”33 Aside from a few
explicit limitations, however, most rights provided by the Constitution do not
acknowledge any distinction between Citizens and noncitizens.34 Among
these rights afforded to all persons are the equal protection of the laws,35 political freedoms of speech and association,36 and the due process requirements
of fair procedure where lives, liberty, or property are at stake.37 Furthermore,
it is well settled that “Persons” within the meaning of the Constitution includes both Citizens and noncitizens equally.38
In the mandatory detention context, the most important constitutional
right afforded to noncitizens is the right to due process of the law. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of the
law.”39 While some lower courts have argued that due process rights do not
extend to certain classes of noncitizens, the Supreme Court has made clear
that due process has long been extended to all aliens within the United States’

33

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–
80 (1976)).
34
See generally U.S. CONST; see also Moore, supra note 29, at 808.
35
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (holding that
freedom of association is an essential part of freedom of speech).
37
U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
38
The Court in Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding held:
It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States
and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth
Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process
of law. Although it later may be established, as respondents contend, that petitioner can
be expelled and deported, yet before his expulsion, he is entitled to notice of the nature
of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Although Congress may prescribe conditions for his expulsion and deportation, not even
Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard.
344 U.S. 590, 596–598, nn.5–7 (1953); see also David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled
to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367–388 (2003); see
generally WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 24:8 (3d ed. 2013) (describing
protection as it applies to aliens).
39
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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borders, even those whose presence is “unlawful, involuntary, or transitory.”40 Therefore, a noncitizen “may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law,”41 though “[t]his does not
preclude . . . civil commitments that are not punitive.”42 In other words, the
government may civilly commit any person “when there is a finding of future
dangerousness and an additional factor such as mental illness ‘that makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.’”43 For this reason, “Congress has created specific categories of aliens
in immigration” that afford noncitizens dissimilar due process procedures for
removal purposes.44 The following Section discusses the statutory framework that grants the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
the power to detain noncitizens without bond during removal proceedings.
B. THE 1996 IIRIRA AND § 1226(C) MANDATORY DETENTION

The IIRIRA, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bill
Clinton, is the current controlling law that authorizes the removal of noncitizens residing in the United States.45 Congress’s restructuring of U.S. immigration laws was in part prompted by the aftermath of three major, historical
events: “the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the initial popularity of antiimmigrant legislation in California in 1994 (Proposition 187), and the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing.”46 In 1996, Congress enacted the IIRIRA to
strengthen immigration-enforcement measures at the border and the interior.47
The IIRIRA amended the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
40
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“Once an alien enters the country, the
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 49–50 (1950); see generally Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding that aliens may not be incarcerated as punishment for immigration violations without regular criminal process).
41
Brian Smith, Charles Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim: Another Step Away From Full Due
Process Protections, 38 AKRON L. REV. 207, 211 n.25 (2005) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535–39 (1979)).
42
See id. at n.26 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)).
43
Id. at n.28 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409–10 (2002)).
44
Moore, supra note 29, at 808.
45
See generally Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C. (2006)).
46
Forced Apart: Families Separated and Immigrants Harmed by United States Deportation Policy, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (July 16, 2007), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/us0707/
5.htm#_Toc169933513 [hereinafter Forced Apart].
47
Id.
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Act (INA) that are relevant to removal of noncitizens who have committed
crimes “to ensure that the worst noncitizen offenders [are] deported from the
United States and to reduce the number of court cases” brought in immigration courts—essentially authorizing fast-track deportation procedures for a
greater number of noncitizens.48 Overall, the 1996 changes to the IIRIRA
have resulted in an increased number of detainees and removal of noncitizens, including many noncitizens who have committed relatively minor, nonviolent offenses.49 A description of these changes is important to an understanding of § 1226(c)’s detention mandate.
1. Inadmissibility vs. Deportability
First, the IIRIRA redefined the distinction between admissible and deportable noncitizens.50 Under the IIRIRA, foreign nationals who seek admission at the border or are not lawfully admitted into the United States are defined as “inadmissible” and subject to the grounds of inadmissibility.51
Foreign nationals who are admitted lawfully (i.e., visa holders or legal permanent residents) are “deportable” and subject to grounds of deportability.52
While both designations can lead to removal, the distinction is important because there are differences between the removal grounds for inadmissibility
and the removal grounds for deportability.
For example, for the government to deport Legal Permanent Residents
(LPRs), an immigration judge must “conduct a hearing and sign[] an order of
removal . . . ,” but DHS is permitted to “administratively” remove, without
an order from an immigration judge, noncitizens who do not have legal status
and have committed a criminal offense, such as an aggravated felony.53 Like
LPRs, many noncitizens without legal status are detained for a protracted
amount of time pending removal proceedings. While this Comment primarily focuses on the prolonged detention without bond of LPRs, the prolonged

48
Id.; see also M. Gavan Montague, Should Aliens Be Indefinitely Detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1231? Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come under Renewed Scrutiny, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1439, 1443 (2001); Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 14,
at 1522.
49
Montague, supra note 48, at 1443–44; 1443; see also, generally Immigration Court
Backlog Tool, supra note 17.
50
Montague, supra note 49, at 1443; see also 8 U.S.C. § 301 (1996).
51
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 212(a)(6), 245(i) (changing the term “entry” to “admission,”
which requires that an immigration officer inspect and admit an alien, rather than just simply
accomplishing the act of crossing the border).
52
Montague, supra note 48, at 1443.
53
Aggravated Felonies and Deportations, TRAC IMMIGR. (June 9, 2006),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/155/.
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detention of noncitizens without legal status is equally constitutionally questionable.
2. Sections 1226(a) and 1226(c)’s Detention Mandate
Second, the IIRIRA adopted the mandatory detention provision, §
1226(c), which requires the mandatory detention of noncitizens who are undergoing removal proceedings for committing a qualifying offense.54 The
provision states:
(c) Detention of criminal aliens
(1) Custody The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who—
(A) is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1182(a)(2) of this title,
(B) is deportable by reason of having committed any offense covered in section
1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B), (C) or (D) of this title,
(C) is deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title on the basis of an
offense for which the alien has been sentence[d] to a term of imprisonment of at least 1
year, or
(D) is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or deportable under
section 1227(a)(4)(B) of this title, when the alien is released, without regard to whether
the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to
55
whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.

Section 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision only applies to noncitizens who are designated “criminal aliens.” This designation is important
because it triggers the Attorney General’s (AG) obligation to detain a noncitizen. As the statute above reads, the AG “shall take into custody,” upon release from prison, parole, or probation, any alien deemed deportable on the
basis of committing an offense covered under the statute.56 The Attorney
General, therefore, has little discretion in detaining noncitizens who have
committed qualifying offenses, and on its face, § 1226(c) provides no statutory possibility for release on bond.57
Conversely, noncitizens designated as noncriminal aliens are subject to
54

Montague, supra note 48, at 1444; Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note
14, at 1522.
55
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
56
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). These offenses include crimes involving “moral turpitude,” violation of any state, federal, or foreign law “involving a substance,” aggravated felonies, certain
firearm offenses, or any crime related to espionage, sabotage, treason, and sedition, or a violation of the Military Selective Service Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i); 8 U.C.S.
§§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B)-(D).
57
Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 14, at 1522.

MEDRANO

2018]

6/2/18 4:34 PM

NOT YET GONE

609

discretionary detention during removal proceedings.58 Section 1226(a) provides that the AG may arrest a noncriminal alien “pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the Unites States,” and the AG has
discretion to “continue to detain the alien; and . . . release the alien on . . .
bond . . . or conditional parole.”59 Thus, under this provision, the AG is authorized to detain a noncriminal alien but is not required to by law, and there
is a statutory possibility for release on bond.
3. Qualifying Offenses Under § 1226(c)
Third, the IIRIRA broadened the grounds that qualify for mandatory detention under § 1226(c) by expanding the definition of an “aggravated felony” to encompass crimes involving more than a one-year prison sentence,
crime of moral turpitude, and crimes involving controlled substances or firearms.60 These new broad categories of crimes are not easily determined, are
often confusing and vague, and are not all defined under federal law.61 For
example, regularly described as a nebulous concept, a crime involving moral
turpitude is not defined by federal law; instead, courts have defined the crime
as “generally a crime that (1) is vile, base, or depraved and (2) violates accepted moral standards.”62 Furthermore, under this new scheme, the term
“aggravated felony” not only covers severe crimes commonly characterized
as felonies, such as rape, drug trafficking, and murder, but also incorporates
less serious crimes, such as petty theft or shoplifting, that are considered misdemeanors in some states but are re-characterized as felonies for immigration
purposes because they carry a potential one-year sentence.63
These new broad categories of crimes that trigger mandatory detention
58

Id.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).
60
Id.; Due Process—Immigration Detention, supra note 14, at 1522.
61
See Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2014); Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
561 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that a crime of moral turpitude “involves ‘an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and man’”) (quoting Vuksanovic v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 439 F.3d 1308, 1311
(11th Cir. 2006)); see also Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (defining moral
turpitude as “conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules
of morality and the duties owed other persons, either individually or to society in general”).
62
See Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/aggravated-felonies-overview (noting
that “judges have noted numerous “non-violent, fairly trivial misdemeanors are considered
aggravated felonies under our immigration laws.”); see also Dawn Marie Johnson, AEDPA
and the IIRIRA: Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, The Legislative Reform, 27 J. LEGIS. 477, 477–78 (2001).
63
Aggravated Felonies: An Overview, supra note 63.
59
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have had a significant impact. In one particular case, Mario, a nineteen-year
old legal permanent resident, “was convicted for possession of 2.5 grams of
marijuana with intent to distribute, which is a misdemeanor offense under
Illinois law.”64 Even though Mario was only sentenced to a “year of supervision—a sentence that is less severe than probation,” the court re-characterized his crime as a felony under immigration law, and he was subsequently
subject to mandatory detention.65
4. The Impact of the 1996 IIRIRA
Congress’s purpose in making these sweeping changes to immigration
policy was “based upon the [g]overnment’s concerns over the risks of flight
and danger to the community.”66 According to a Senate Report, § 1226(c)
was enacted “to curtail the ‘serious and growing threat to public safety’ posed
by criminal noncitizens.”67 At the time the statute was enacted, more than
20% of all undetained noncitizens who had been convicted of a crime failed
to report to their removal proceedings.68 Therefore, Congress enacted
§ 1226(c) to require that all noncitizens that have committed a deportable
offense be detained during removal proceedings on the basis of safety concerns as well as accountability.69
Congress, however, did not envision § 1226(c) as an indefinite prison
sentence for noncitizens that have already served their prison sentence: in
1996, removal proceedings took at most 90 days to be completed.70 Over the
years, however, the broadened offenses that fell within the grounds of deportability and immigration priorities have created an influx in the number of
removal cases, which has contributed to the immigration court backlog and
increase in wait time for the start and completion of removal proceedings.71
Today, however, immigration judges (IJs) are unlikely to complete removal proceedings in the 90 days.72 Data show that as of July 2017, the
average number of days a case is pending on the immigration court docket

64

Forced Apart, supra note 46.
Id.
66
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003).
67
See Gerard Savaresse, When Is When?: 8 U.S.C. § 1226(C) and the Requirements of
Mandatory Detention, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 285, 299 (2013).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 300.
70
Id. at 299.
71
Despite Hiring, Immigration Court Backlog and Wait Times Climb, TRAC IMMIGR.
(May 15, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/468/.
72
See TRAC, supra note 18.
65
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until decision is 682 days, and in some states—specifically Colorado, Michigan, Illinois, Nebraska, Ohio, California, New Jersey, Arizona, Nevada, and
Georgia—the wait time substantially exceeds that average.73 For example,
in Colorado, the average is a staggering 1,037 days; in Illinois, the average is
1,007 days; in Texas, the average is 818 days; and in New Jersey, the average
is 814 days.74 For noncitizens charged with criminal offenses, including
noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(c), the national average number of
days a case is pending before a decision is entered is even higher, at 897 days,
with Texas’s average being the highest at 1,132 days.75 Section 1226(c) has
thus had a significant effect on the number of detained noncitizens, “with
harsh consequences for these individuals, their families, and communities
across the country.”76
In short, the 1996 IIRIRA made sweeping changes that broadened the
types of crimes that could result in mandatory detention and possible removal. These changes have resulted in the prolonged mandatory detention of
many immigrants, including those who have legal residency, for committing
minor, nonviolent offenses that are not even classified as egregious crimes
on the state level.
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE TWO APPROACHES ADOPTED BY
THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Key Supreme Court and circuit court cases have addressed mandatory
detention pursuant to § 1226(c). As the following Sections explain, while the
Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention without bond of “criminal” noncitizens undergoing removal proceedings, circuit
courts have interpreted the statute to contain an implicit time limitation.
These lower courts have applied differing approaches to determine at what
point detention without bond becomes unreasonably prolonged or unjustified. The following Sections examine these key cases.
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT PRE-JENNINGS

Two landmark Supreme Court cases addressed the constitutionality of
prolonged detention of noncitizens: Zadvydas v. Davis77 and Demore v.
Kim.78 In Zadvydas, the Court held that indefinite detention of noncitizens
73

Immigration Court Backlog Tool, supra note 17.
See TRAC, supra note 18.
75
Id.
76
Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 363 (2014).
77
See generally 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
78
See generally 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
74
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post-removal order is constitutionally impermissible past six months unless
the government can demonstrate removal in the foreseeable future or a special circumstance.79 While Zadvydas does not concern § 1226(c) pre-removal-order detention, lower courts have cited the decision for support in
interpreting § 1226(c).80
In Demore, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1226(c)
on the basis of Congress’s concerns of flight risk and dangerousness, and
importantly on the finding that in a majority of cases, detention had a definite
termination date of less than 90 days.81 The Demore decision was a significant setback for the due process rights of detained noncitizens: despite the
Court’s view of promptness in removal proceedings, many detainees have
been detained far longer than the 90-day period the court envisioned.82
1. Zadvydas v. Davis
Zadvydas involved two cases from separate jurisdictions that were consolidated by the Court, where both noncitizens were detained indefinitely
post-removal order.83 Kestutis Zadvydas, an LPR born in a displaced persons
camp in Germany to Lithuanian parents who immigrated with his family to
the U.S. when he was eight-years-old, filed the first case.84 Zadvydas had an
extensive criminal record of attempted robbery in the third degree,85 and a
history of flight.86 Zadvydas completed sixteen years in prison for his crimes
and was released on parole.87 He was then taken into custody by immigration
officials, and subsequently ordered to be deported to Germany in 1994.88
However, Germany and Lithuania refused to accept Zadvydas, claiming that
he was not a citizen of either country.89 The second case involved Kim Ho
79

533 U.S. at 679.
See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 843 (2018).
81
538 U.S. at 512.
82
Joren Lyons, Mandatory Detention During Removal Proceedings: Challenging the Applicability of Demore v. Kim to Vietnamese and Laotian Detainees, 12 ASIAN AM. L.J. 231,
239 (2005).
83
See 533 U.S. at 686.
84
Id. at 684.
85
Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D. La. 1997), rev’d sub
nom. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion withdrawn and superseded sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis,
285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), aff’d as modified sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398
(5th Cir. 2002).
86
Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. At 1014.
80

87
88
89

Id.
Id. at 1015.
See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684; see generally Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000),
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Ma, a resident alien born in Cambodia who fled with his family to Thailand
and the Philippines before arriving in the United States at the age of seven.90
Ma was convicted of manslaughter, and after completing his prison sentence,
he was released, detained by immigration officials, and ordered to be removed from the United States.91 Similar to Zadvydas, Ma could not return to
his home country.
Because Zadvydas and Ma could not return back to their home countries, they remained civilly detain indefinitely in immigration detention centers.92 After being detained for years, both filed habeas petitions in their respective jurisdictions arguing that permanent confinement pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) was unconstitutional, and the federal district courts
ordered them released on those grounds.93 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding in Mr. Zadvydas’s case, reasoning that “detention did not violate the Constitution because eventual deportation was not
‘impossible,’ good-faith efforts to remove Zadvydas from the United States
continued, and Zadvydas’s detention was subject to periodic administrative
review.”94 On appeal in Ma’s case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his release and
“concluded, based in part on constitutional concerns, that the statute did not
authorize detention for more than a ‘reasonable time’ beyond the 90-day period authorized for removal.”95 The Supreme Court subsequently granted
writs in both cases, joined them for oral argument, and decided them together.96
Section 1231(a)(1)(A) states that “when [a noncitizen] is ordered to be
removed, the [AG] shall remove the alien from the [U.S.] within a period of
90 days.”97 If the alien is not removed after the 90-day period expires, an
noncitizen “may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall
be subject to the terms of supervision.”98 While some courts have interpreted
vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion modified and reinstated
sub nom. Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001).
90
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685; Reno, 208 F.3d at 819.
91
Id.
92
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699; Reno, 208 F.3d at 819.
93
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85; Reno, 208 F.3d at 820.
94
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 685; see generally Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011
(E.D. La. 1997), rev’d sub nom. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), opinion withdrawn and superseded
sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), aff’d as modified sub nom.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002).
95
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686; see Reno, 208 F.3d at 827.
96
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686.
97
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2012).
98
8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1), (6) (2012).
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the plain language of § 1231(a)(1)(A) as allowing for the indefinite detention
of noncitizens unable to leave the U.S., the Supreme Court in Zadvydas found
“nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly demonstrate[d] a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, and perhaps permanent, detention.”99
The Court held that the INA’s post-removal-period detention provision
contains an implicit reasonableness limitation of six months.100 The Court
reasoned that while the plain language of § 1231(a)(1)(A) does not impose
an explicit limitation on detention after the 90-day removal period, “interpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat . . . once removal is
no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized
by statute.”101 Further, the Court explained that “for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,”. . . six months is the appropriate “reasonable time” after which the “alien provides good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,
the [g]overnment must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”102
The Court’s decision in Zadvydas was a major step in the right direction
for protecting the due process rights of detained noncitizens. The Court recognized that noncitizens, even noncitizens who are ordered deported, are protected by the Constitution, and detaining noncitizens indefinitely without
bond violates their constitutional rights to liberty and due process under the
law.
2. Demore v. Kim
Two years after Zadvydas was decided, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the case Demore v. Kim, which challenged the constitutionality of
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).103 Hyung Joon Kim came to
the United States from South Korea when he was six years old as an LPR.104
As an adult, Kim was convicted of “petty theft with priors,” and after he
completed his sentence, he was detained pending his removal proceeding
pursuant to § 1226(c).105 Kim filed a habeas petition arguing that he was
entitled to a bond hearing to determine whether he “posed either a danger to
the community or a flight risk.”106 The district court agreed and held that
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
Id. at 680–81.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 701.
See generally Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id.
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unless § 1226(c) is interpreted to contain an implicit time limitation to detention without bond, the statute unconstitutionally deprives noncitizens of their
right to due process.107 Kim was subsequently granted a bond hearing and
released on a $5,000 bond.108 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision and concluded that “[the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), since subsumed into DHS] had not provided a ‘special justification’ for no-bail civil detention sufficient to overcome a lawful permanent
resident alien’s liberty interest.”109 The government appealed.110
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and held that § 1226(c) was constitutional.111 The Court opined that
“[a]lthough the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation
proceedings, detention during such proceedings is a constitutionally valid aspect of the process, even where . . . there has been no finding that they are
unlikely to appear for their deportation proceedings.”112 The Court emphasized Congress’s concern that deportable noncitizens who have committed
prior crimes are likely to continue to engage in crime and fail to show up for
deportation hearings in large numbers.113 Furthermore, the Court distinguished Zadvydas and explained that while there was a real concern of possible indefinite detention under § 1231(a)(1)(A), such a concern does not exist under § 1226(c) because detainees are only detained for the duration of
their removal proceedings, which at the time was mostly a period of “less
than . . . 90 days.”114 Thus, in deciding that § 1226(c) is constitutional, the
court focused centrally on the brief duration of mandatory detention at the
time Demore was decided.
While Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court by providing the
vital fifth vote in the majority’s 5–4 opinion, he wrote a noteworthy concurring opinion that left open the possibility of constitutional concerns that may
arise when detention becomes unreasonably prolonged:
[S]ince the Due Process Clause prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became
unreasonable or unjustified. Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in

107

See Kim v. Schiltgen, No. C 99-2257SI, 1999 WL 33944060, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
10, 1999).
108
Id.
109
Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2002).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 511 (2003) (citations omitted).
113
Id. at 513.
114
Id. at 511–12.
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pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to
inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk
115
of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion makes clear that while the Demore decision upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention, detention without
a bond hearing must be limited in duration so as not to deprive noncitizens
of their right to due process.
Since Demore, “courts have struggled to reconcile Zadvydas and
Demore in the context of pre-removal detention.”116 While the Supreme
Court in Zadvydas held that post-removal detention becomes unreasonably
prolonged at the six-month mark, Demore upheld the constitutionality of
mandatory detention pre-removal-order without determining at what point
such detention becomes unreasonably prolonged.117 Prior to the recent Supreme Court decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez, federal courts have reconciled these two decisions by interpreting § 1226(c) to include an implied time
limit against prolonged detention without bond.118 To determine at which
point detention without bond is unconstitutional, federal courts have adopted
a bright-line and case-by-case approach.
B. CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH PRE-JENNINGS

The First, Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a case-bycase approach is a better-suited approach for determining when mandatory
detention without bond is unjustified.119 The case-by-case approach permits
a detained noncitizen to file a habeas petition that if granted, triggers a bond
hearing.
1. Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security
In Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security, the petitioner, Cheikh Diop, was a
Senegalese citizen who unlawfully migrated to the United States and was

115
Id. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Savaresse, supra
note 67, at 301.
116
Michelle Firemacion, Protecting Immigrants from Prolonged Pre-Removal Detention:
When it “Depends” is No Longer Reasonable, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 601, 608 (2015).
117
Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 510.
118
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 510 (2003).
119
See, e.g., Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486 (1st Cir. 2016); Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825
F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2011); Ly v.
Hansen, 351 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2003).
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convicted and taken into custody for committing the crime of “recklessly endangering another person.”120 At his second hearing, where Diop was representing himself, the government charged him with the additional crime of
having possessed a controlled substance with the intent to manufacture or
distribute.121 Following the second conviction, Diop filed multiple motions
and appeals to the court, all while detained pending his removal proceeding
pursuant to § 1226(c)’s detention mandate. By the time the case reached the
appellate court, Diop was detained for a total of “1,072 days—two years,
eleven months, and five days.”122
The facts in Diop perfectly demonstrate that interpreting § 1226(c) without a time limit can result in serious constitutional issues.123 As the Third
Circuit pointed out, this was exactly the concern of Justice Kennedy in
Demore: § 1226(c) detention mandate “might still violate the Due Process
Clause if ‘the continued detention became unreasonable or unjustified.’”124
Diop’s situation was exactly the prolonged detention that becomes unreasonable and constitutionally impermissible.125 The Third Circuit construed §
1226(c) as containing an implicit time limitation against prolonged detention
without bond.126 The court adopted a case-by-case approach to determine the
time limit where courts “make an individualized inquiry into whether detention is still necessary to fulfill the statute’s purposes of ensuring that a noncitizen attends removal proceedings and that his or her release will not pose a
danger to the community.”127
2. Ly v. Hansen
In Ly v. Hansen, Hoang Minh Ly was a Vietnam refugee who entered
the United States in 1986.128 Ly was convicted of credit card and bank fraud,
and he fully served his sentence on both convictions.129 Shortly after being
released, the INS took Ly into custody and the IJ entered a written order stating that Ly was removable to Vietnam. The Board of Immigration appealed,
and the government filed a motion with the Sixth Circuit to remand the case
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Diop, 656 F.3d at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 232 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 532 (2003)).
Id. at 233.

Id. at 234 (reasoning that “[r]easonableness, by its very nature, is a fact-dependent
inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the circumstances of any given case”).
127
Id. at 231.
128
Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 2003).
129
Id.
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back to the district court. Ly was detained for 500 days while these proceedings were taking place and was only released afterward by the INS, subject
to specific conditions and supervision.130
The Third Circuit held that due process requires that § 1226(c) be interpreted as having a time limit against unreasonably prolonged and unjustified
detention. The court rejected the bright-line approach and adopted a caseby-case approach reasoning that the “bright-line limitation . . . would not be
appropriate,” because “courts must examine the facts of each case, to determine whether there has been unreasonable delay in concluding removal proceedings.”131
3. Reid v. Donelan
In Reid v. Donelan, Mark Anthony Reid came to the United States as an
LPR, served in the U.S. Army, pursued higher education, and owned his own
business.132 However, “Reid amassed an extensive criminal record, including larceny, assault, drug and weapon possession, failure to appear, interfering with an officer, driving on a suspended license, selling drugs, violation
of probation, and burglary.”133 After completing his prison sentence, Reid
was released and subsequently detained pursuant to § 1226(c) without a bond
hearing134 for over a year pending removal proceedings.135 Reid filed a habeas petition along with a class-action suit and argued that “§ 1226(c) contains an implicit ‘reasonableness’ requirement and should be read to authorize mandatory detention only up to six months, at which time the government
must provide a bond hearing.”136
On appeal, the First Circuit held that, based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, § 1226(c) should be read to include an implicit time limit.137
The court, however, disagreed with the bright-line, six-month rule, and instead adopted a case-by-case approach, listing factors to “provide guideposts
for other courts.”138 The court’s factors included length of the detention,

130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id.
Id. at 271.
Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 491 (1st Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 492.

137
Id. at 496 (reasoning that “the secondary six-month rule was predicated on there being
no foreseeable hope of removal” and that under § 1226(c), removability, as well as release in
some circumstances, is foreseeable).
138
Id. at 501.
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foreseeability of proceedings concluding in the near future, period of detention compared to the completed criminal sentence, the promptness (or delay)
of the immigration authorities or the detainee, and the likelihood that the proceedings will culminate in a final removal order.139
4. Sopo v. U.S. Attorney General
The latest case to advocate the case-by-case approach is Sopo v. United
States Attorney General.140 In this case, the petitioner, Maxi Dingo Sopo,
came to the U.S. on asylum from Cameroon, and after being in the country
for six years, he pled guilty to an aggravated felony.141 Sopo was taken into
custody after completing his criminal sentence, and he subsequently filed a
habeas petition requesting a bond hearing.142
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that as a matter of constitutional
avoidance, § 1226(c) must be construed to contain an implicit time limit.143
The court adopted a case-by-case approach, reasoning that such an approach
“adheres more closely to legal precedent and the practical advantages.”144
Like the First Circuit in Reid, the Eleventh Circuit enumerated non-exhaustive reasonableness factors: the amount of time that the noncitizen has been
in detention without a bond hearing; reasons for the protracted proceedings;
the possibility of removal after a final order of removal; whether the detainee’s civil immigration detention exceeds the time the detainee spent in
prison for the crime that rendered him removable; and whether the facility
for the civil immigration detention is meaningfully different from a penal institution for criminal detention.145
C. BRIGHT-LINE APPROACH PRE-JENNINGS

The Second and Ninth Circuits adopted a bright-line rule of six months
for presumptive reasonableness pre-removal orders, after which a noncitizen
is entitled to periodic bond hearings to determine whether continued detention is reasonable or justified.
1. Lora v. Shanahan
In Lora v. Shanahan, Alexander Lora was convicted of a felony drug
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 500.
Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1201.
Id.
Id.
Sopo, 825 F.3d at 1201.
Id. at 1218.
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offense in the United States, and after completing his prison sentence, he was
taken into custody pursuant to § 1226(c).146 Lora subsequently filed a habeas
petition challenging his continued detention and argued that imprisonment
without a bond hearing raised constitutional due process concerns.147 The
district court agreed and ordered Lora’s release, and the government appealed.148
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that while a constitutional argument
was not presented in this case, § 1226(c) must be read to include a time limit
on prolonged detention without bond,149 and adopted the bright-line approach.150 First, it reasoned that “Zadvydas and Demore, taken together, suggest that the preferred approach for avoiding due process concerns in this area
is to establish a presumptively reasonable six-month period of detention.”151
Second, “the pervasive inconsistency and confusion exhibited by district
courts in this Circuit when asked to apply a reasonableness test on a case-bycase basis weighs . . . in favor of adopting an approach that affords more
certainty and predictability.”152
The court explained that this is especially true for the Ninth and Second
Circuits that “have been disproportionately burdened by a surge in immigration appeals and a corresponding surge in the sizes of their immigration dockets.”153 The court noted that the number of noncitizens detained pursuant to
§ 1226(c) has substantially increased with the passage of the IIRIRA that
“expanded the definition of criminal aliens . . . who violate state criminal
laws, which, combined with a simultaneous rise in immigration to the United
States, has resulted in an enormous increase in the number of aliens taken
into custody pending removal.”154 Third, the court reasoned that without a
six-month rule, endless months of detention—often caused by nothing more
than bureaucratic backlog—will have real-life consequences for immigrants
and their families.155

146

Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2015).
Id.
148
See generally Lora v. Shanahan, 15 F. Supp. 3d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 804 F.3d
601 (2d Cir. 2015).
149
Lora, 804 F.3d at 614–15.
150
Id. at 616.
151
Id. at 615.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 615–16.
154
Id. at 604.
155
Id. at 616.
147
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2. Rodriguez v. Robbins I and II
In Rodriguez I, Alejandro Rodriguez, an LPR, was detained during the
course of his removal proceedings.156 After three years of incarceration,
Alejandro and a class of detained LPRs he represented filed a habeas corpus
petition that argued that §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not authorize
prolonged detention without bond.157 The district court granted the class a
preliminary injunction and ordered the government to provide individual
hearings before an IJ to determine whether continued detention was justified,
and the government appealed.158 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the canon of constitutional avoidance to construe the relevant provisions as imposing a time limit on prolonged detention without bond.159 The
court adopted a bright-line rule, concluding that “detention is prolonged
when it has lasted six months and is expected to continue more than minimally beyond six months.”160
After the Ninth Circuit decided Rodriguez v. Robbins I, the district court
granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction on behalf of the entire class, and the government again appealed the decision of the lower court
to the Ninth Circuit.161 In Rodriguez v. Robbins II, the Ninth Circuit again
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that § 1226(c) detainees are entitled to automatic and periodic bond hearings after six months of detention.162 The Ninth Circuit described the devastating nature of civil immigration for detained noncitizens:
Class members spend, on average, 404 days in immigration detention . . . . In some
cases, detention has lasted much longer: As of April 28, 2012, when the government
generated data to produce to the petitioners, one class member had been detained for
1,585 days, approaching four and a half years of civil confinement. Non-citizens who
vigorously pursue claims for relief from removal face substantially longer detention
periods than those who concede removability . . . . Class members frequently have

156

See Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez I), 715 F.3d 1127, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
158
Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, Nos. CV 07–03239–TJH (RNBx), SA CV 11–
01287–TJH (RNBx), 2012 WL 7653016, *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2012).
159
Rodriguez I, 715 F.3d at 1137, 1146.
160
Id. at 1138 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011))
(“[D]etention is prolonged when it has lasted six months and is expected to continue more than
minimally beyond six months.”).
161
See Rodriguez v. Holder, No. CV 07-3239 TJH (RNBX), 2013 WL 5229795, *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015).
162
Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding that “class members are entitled to automatic bond hearings after six months of detention”).
157
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strong ties to this country . . . . Prolonged detention imposes severe hardship on class
163
members and their families.

The Ninth Circuit stated that prolonged detention of this nature raises serious
constitutional issues of “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint,” all of which lie “at
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”164 Relying on
Rodriguez I, the court adopted a “six-month mark” for when detention without bond becomes prolonged.165
On March 25, 2016, petitioner David Jennings, in his capacity as the
field office director of the Los Angeles, California Office of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court challenging the Ninth Circuit’s decision.166 The Supreme Court
granted writ to Jennings v. Rodriguez and recently issued its opinion on the
case.
D. JENNINGS V. RODRIGUEZ

The Supreme Court in Jennings v. Rodriguez reversed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Rodriguez II and held that § 1226(c) cannot be interpreted
to contain an implicit time limitation because the statute, according to the
Court, was clear and unambiguous.167 The majority’s opinion, however, left
much unanswered as the Court declined to consider whether its interpretation
of § 1226(c) rendered the statute unconstitutional.168 Rather, the Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit to consider whether its interpretation is unconstitutional.169 The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, written
by Justice Breyer, fervently disagreed with the majority’s opinion and addressed the constitutional concerns of interpreting § 1226(c) as not containing an implicit time limit on detention without bond.170

163
164
165
166

Rodriguez II, 804 F.3d at 1072–73.
Id. at 1066 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001)).
Id. at 1079.
See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).

167

See generally Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).

168

Id. at 851.

169

Id.

170

Id. at 861 (Breyer J., dissenting).
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1. The Opinion171
In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that the Ninth Circuit in Rodriguez
II misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance to construe §§ 1225(b),
1226(a), and 1226(c) as including a time limit on prolonged detention without bond.172 The court explained that “[t]he canon of constitutional avoidance
comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis,
the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction.”173 After
an examination of the text of each provision, the Court concluded that, because “the relevant statutory provisions is clear,” the canon does not apply
and the lower court’s construction is implausible.174
In regard to § 1226(c) specifically, the Court reasoned that first “§
1226(c) is not ‘silent’ as to the length of detention” because the statute’s language mandates detention pending a decision on removal.175 Second, §
1226(c)’s specification that certain circumstances may lead to a detainee’s
release, such as witness protection purposes, demonstrates that other forms
of release, such as release on bond, are prohibited.176 Third, the Court reasoned that § 1226(c) “together with § 1226(a) . . . makes clear that detention
of aliens within its scope must continue ‘pending a decision’ on removal.”177
For these reasons, the Court concluded that an analysis of § 1226(c)’s statutory language “falls far short of a ‘plausible statutory construction’” sufficient to invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance.178
The Court, however, declined to address the constitutional argument—
whether its strict interpretation of § 1226(c) renders the statute unconstitutional. Instead, the court stated that:
[b]ecause the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that periodic bond hearings are
required under the immigration provisions at issue here, it had no occasion to consider
respondents' constitutional arguments on their merits. Consistent with our role as ‘a
court of review, not of first view,’ we do not reach those arguments. Instead, we remand
the case to the Court of Appeals to consider them in the first instance.179

171
This section does not discuss the facts and procedural history involved in Jennings as
they are identical to the facts described above in Rodriguez I and II.
172
173

Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842.
Id. (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted).

174

Id. at 849.

175

Id.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id. at 851 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n.7 (2005)).
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2. The Dissent
Writing with passionate opposition, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented to all parts of the majority’s decision.180
First, the dissent described the key characteristics of the group of noncitizens
that were a part of the class action before the Court.181 The dissent described
that all the asylum seekers were fleeing persecution from their home countries, all the detainees who have committed crimes were detained after serving their criminal sentences, and all members of the third group who arrived
at the borders seeking entry for reasons other than asylum might have a meritorious claim to admissibility.182 The dissent further explained that these
classes of detained noncitizens “number in thousands,” the length of detention is often prolonged, many of the detainees eventually do actually obtain
relief, immigration detention centers where these detainees are confined are
similar in many respects to prisons and jails, and in some cases, the conditions of detention are significantly worse.183
The dissent then addressed the constitutional question that the majority
declined to consider—whether § 1226(c) entitled detainees to bond hearings
to determine whether he or she poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community. Breyer concluded: “In my view, the relevant constitutional language, purposes, history, tradition, and case law all make clear that the majority’s interpretation at the very least would raise ‘grave doubts’ about the
statute’s constitutionality.”184
First, the dissent considered the relevant constitutional language and
the values that it protects. It argued that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause extends to all persons within the territory of the U.S., irrespective of
a person’s immigration status.185 This is because “[f]reedom from arbitrary
detention is as ancient and important a right as any found within the Constitution's boundaries.”186 Second, the dissent argued that American history
also demonstrates that bail is a practice that is entrenched in our legal system.187 The dissent explained that Blackstone and the Judiciary Act of 1798

180

Id. at 860 (Breyer J., dissenting).

181

Id.
Id.

182
183

Id. at 860–61.

184

Id. at 861.

185

Id. at 862 (“No one can claim, nor since the time of slavery has anyone to my
knowledge successfully claimed, that persons held within the United States are totally without
constitutional protection.”)
186

Id.

187

Id. at 863.

MEDRANO

2018]

6/2/18 4:34 PM

NOT YET GONE
188

625

both provided rights to bail.
Today, similar practices have remained part
of our legal tradition, for example all criminal cases have been provided the
possibility of release on bail under federal laws.189 Furthermore, the dissent
noted that while immigration detention cases are not criminal cases, there is
a strong “basis for reading the Constitution’s bail requirements as extending
to” civil immigration cases as “the law treats like cases alike. And reason
tells us that the civil confinement at issue here and the pretrial criminal con190
finement that calls for bail are in every relevant sense identical.”
Third, the dissent examined case law and argued that the Court, while
sometimes denying bail to some individuals, had never held that bail is unnecessary.191 The court cited several decisions from different time periods in
American history, ending with the Court’s decision in Demore, which only
found detention without bond constitutional for a limited period of time to
arrange removal.192 Fourth, the dissent argued that the statutory language
“shall be detained” under § 1226(c) does not mean that the detained noncitizens must be detained without bail193 because the word “detain” is ambiguous
and has readily coexisted with the word bail.194 Lastly, the dissent argued
that there is also nothing in the statute or the legislative history that demonstrates Congress intended prolonged detention without bail.
In regard to § 1226(c), specifically, the dissent argued that the statute’s
use of the term “take into custody” has long been interpreted as not requiring
that a prisoner be confined, and at any rate should not be interpreted differently from “detain.”195 In addition, § 1226(c)’s phrase that prohibits the statute from applying to persons in witness protection also does not demonstrate
that detention without bail is authorized by the statute “because the phrase
has nothing to do with bail. It has to do with a special program, the Witness
Protection Program, set forth in . . . § 3521” which “allows the Attorney General to relocate the witness, to give him an entirely new identity, to help his
family similarly, and to pay him a stipend, among other things.”196

188

Id.

189

Id. at 864.
Id. at 865.
Id.

190
191
192

Id. at 866–69.

193

Id. at 870.

194

Id. at 872.
Id.

195
196

Id. at 873.
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3. Argument in Favor of the Dissent
The majority’s decision in Jennings failed to enforce the Constitution
and protect the due process rights of detained noncitizens. As Justice Breyer
argued, the majority’s interpretation of § 1226(c) at the very least raises serious doubts about the statute’s constitutionality as applied to detained noncitizens. However, the majority declined to even consider the constitutional
question, and in doing so, it also declined to protect the constitutional rights
of detained noncitizens.
Section 1226(c) is not clear or unambiguous. First, § 1226(c)’s mention of bail is irrelevant. While there is nothing in the language of § 1226(c)
that states that bail is required, there is also nothing in the language of the
statute that authorizes detention without bail. As Justice Breyer argued, what
is clear is that bail has been historically provided to detained individuals
throughout our country’s history and even today. Second, the majority’s focus on the length of detention misses the point. The majority noted that the
statute is not silent as to the length of detention because it states detention is
only required until removal proceedings conclude. The issue, however, is
not about the length of detention; the issue is about prolonged detention without bond. When prolonged detention is coupled with the impossibility of
bond, then issues of constitutionality arise. So, while § 1226(c) specifies the
length of detention, it is ambiguous as to the length of detention without bond.
Finally, all federal courts before Jennings interpreted § 1226(c) as requiring
a time limit to avoid an unconstitutional interpretation, yet the Court declined
to consider whether its interpretation raises constitutional concerns. For
these reasons, the majority’s decision in Jennings was incorrectly decided,
and § 1226(c) should be interpreted as containing a time limit to detention
without bond to avoid violating the due process rights of detained noncitizens.
III. PROPOSAL FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION FOR NONCITIZENS WITH
STRONG EQUITIES
Unlike the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings, the bright-line and
case-by-case approaches adopted by the circuit courts pre-Jennings are a step
in the right direction for protecting the rights of 1226(c)’s detained noncitizens. However, these approaches still fall short in striking the right balance
between the due process rights and liberty interests of detained noncitizens
against the security interests of the government.
A. STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE

The case-by-case and bright-line approaches do not properly protect de-
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tainees’ liberty and due process interests because both approaches categorically presume “that an alien’s detention for the first six months is reasonable
and justified.”197 For example, the bright-line approach only requires periodic bond hearings after six months of detention. The case-by-case approach
permits detainees to file a habeas petition at any time during their detention,
but detention for less than six months is a strong mitigating factor against
granting the petition.198
The weight these approaches place on this presumption is misplaced.
Due process requires mandatory detention to be reasonably related to the
government’s purported immigration purpose of preventing flight and protecting public safety.199 Without a compelling governmental interest in continued detention, mandatory detention without bond does not overcome a
noncitizen’s constitutional liberty interests.200
For many detained noncitizens, there is no compelling governmental interest in detention. The stories highlighted by the Community Initiative for
Visiting Aliens in Confinement (CIVIC) demonstrate that many noncitizens
detained pursuant to § 1226(c) pose little threat to the community and are not
a flight risk at any point during their mandatory detention sentence.201 These
individuals are likely to be granted release on bond and are likely to win their
cases to remain in the United States.202 Yet, under the current approaches,
these noncitizens are detained and precluded from a bond determination for
at least six months. The presumptively reasonable six-month period under
the bright-line and case-by-case approaches thus improperly balances the detainee’s due process interests against the government’s interest in protecting
the public and preventing flight.
Empirical evidence also demonstrates that many noncitizens are neither
a danger to the community or a flight risk. For example, in a study that contrasted criminal pretrial detention with civil pre-removal order immigration
detention, findings showed that detained noncitizens are less of a flight and

197
198

Firemacion, supra note 116, at 621.

Id.; see also Sopo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting
that under the case-by-case approach, “there is little chance that a criminal alien’s detention is
unreasonable until at least the six-month mark”).
199
See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531–32 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
200
See id. (noting that “[l]iberty under the Due Process Clause includes protection against
unlawful or arbitrary personal restraint or detention” (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
718 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
201
See The Brief, supra note 1.
202
Id.
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public safety risk than detained criminals.203 Detained noncitizens are less
likely to commit crimes than native-born citizens,204 and there are lower recidivism rates found for noncitizens than criminal detainees.205 Furthermore,
“criminal empirical researchers . . . found no evidence that lack of U.S. citizenship increases flight risk.”206 Releasing noncitizens with strong equities,
therefore, does not frustrate the government’s interest in preventing dangerousness and flight because many of these detainees have no interest in further
engaging in criminal activity or failing to appear to their removal proceedings.
Detained noncitizens, on the other hand, pay a significant price. Noncitizens are treated worse than citizens accused of a serious crime. In our criminal justice system, criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven
guilty and are constitutionally entitled to receive bail at a reasonable time
after being detained.207 “Most studies show that criminal judges release a majority of defendants pretrial . . . even including defendants with more serious
charges.”208 Noncitizens detained under § 1226(c), however, are not entitled
to bond for at least six months because of the presumption that detention for
six months is reasonable, irrespective of whether they are a flight risk or a
danger to the community.209
Mandatory detention also significantly harms detainees and their families.210 Detained noncitizens are separated from their families, subjected to
limited visitation and communication with them,211 and placed in detention

203

NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & JOSH ROVNER, SENT’G PROJECT, IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC
SAFETY 70–71 (Mar. 16, 2017), available at https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications
/immigration-public-safety/.
204
Id. at 71.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 72.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209

Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 70 (2014).
210

See The Brief, supra note 1 (“Immigration detention is, in theory, a civil procedure and
not punitive incarceration. In reality, it inflicts profound suffering on detained people and
their families, as they recount below.”).
211

Caitlin Patler & Tonya Maria Golash-Boza, The fiscal and human costs of immigrant
detention and deportation in the United States, 11 SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 1, 3 (2017), available
at https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12536 (“A recent study of 462 detained parents found that access to child visitation was not equally distributed: Individuals detained in private facilities
were less likely to receive visits from their children, and individuals with undocumented children received relatively fewer visits from their children than those without undocumented
children.”).
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centers that are often located outside of their home state.212 In some cases,
detained noncitizens’ children are forced into foster care because no other
person is available to take care of them while their parent is detained.213 Others lose their jobs, businesses, and homes, or their education is disrupted.214
Furthermore, immigration detention facilities are essentially indistinguishable from prison and sometimes considered worse.215 Detained noncitizens are detained behind bars in a prison jumpsuit under the same conditions
as people currently serving prison sentences for violent criminal offenses.216
Many of these facilities are owned and run by private prison companies that
have a reputation for having poor track records on prison conditions.217 According to a federal report, detained noncitizens are subject to inhumane
treatment, given insufficient hygiene supplies and medical care, and provided
potentially unsafe food.218 This report also found that detainees “were housed
incorrectly based on their criminal history” and that staff prevented detainees
from filing grievances and took part in mistreating detainees.219 Other
sources demonstrate that detainees are also subjected to arbitrary solitary

212

Id; see also The Brief, supra note 1.

213

See The Brief, supra note 1 (detailing how Alexander Lora, the appellee in Lora v.
Shanahan, had to place his son in foster care after he was detained).
214
Id. (discussing how Sayid Omargharib lost his business while detained because he
could not keep up with business expenses and his clientele left permanently to other business
and he was unable to replace them); see also Patler & Golash-Boza, supra note 211, at 3 (noting that a studied “revealed that detention contributed to extreme financial insecurity for the
family members of detained individuals. Respondents had, on average, lived in the United
States for 20 years, and 69% have a U.S. Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident spouse or
child. A full 94% reported being a source of financial or emotional support for their families
prior to detention”).
215
Patler & Golash-Boza, supra note 211, at 3.
216

Id.

217

The Brief, supra note 1.

218

See generally OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CONCERNS ABOUT
ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT DETENTION FACILITIES (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-12/OIG-18-32-Dec17.pdf; see also
Patler & Golash-Boza, supra note 211, at 3 (noting that “[s]erious allegations have emerged
about life inside detention centers, including improper management and operation, particularly
regarding the provision of preventative and emergency health care services and access to attorney visits”).
219

OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 218.
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confinement220 and sexual abuse by staff and other detainees.221
In short, the current approaches adopted by the circuit courts do not
properly protect detainees’ constitutional rights because both approaches limiting detainees’ opportunity to challenge their continued detention, which
raises the same “serious doubts” of constitutionality that Justice Breyer argued are raised when § 1226(c) is interpreted as forbidding an individualized
bond hearing.
B. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION FOR NONCITIZENS WITH STRONG
EQUITIES

Noncitizens that are detained pursuant to § 1226(c) should be given the
opportunity to apply for prosecutorial discretion to defer action on their mandatory detention.222 If granted, these noncitizens should be released, under
supervision, if necessary, during the course of their removal proceedings. If
not granted, noncitizens should then be entitled to automatic and periodic
bond hearing after six months of detention.
1. Prosecutorial Discretion
Prosecutorial discretion in immigration law “refers to the decision the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes,” as an agency of the executive branch, “about whether to enforce the immigration laws against a person or a group of persons.”223 The concept of prosecutorial discretion applies
in many contexts, including administrative, civil, and criminal contexts, and

220
See generally NIJC & PHR, INVISIBLE IN ISOLATION: THE USE OF SEGREGATION AND
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRANT DETENTION (2012), http://static.prisonpolicy.org/
scans/Invisible.pdf.
221

Safia Samee Ali, Sexual Assaults in Immigration Detention Centers Rarely Get Investigated, Group Charges, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/sexual-assaults-immigration-detention-centers-don-t-get-investigated-says-n745616.
222
The current administration’s enforcement priorities state that every deportable noncitizen is a priority. See Exec. Order No. 13767, Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13768, Enhancing
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
The administration’s enforcement priorities, however, cannot feasibly identify, arrest, and deport all groups of noncitizens, especially since data shows that the U.S. is already over-capacity in detention, and immigration courts are overwhelmingly backlogged. The current administration’s immigration policy will inevitably tip towards some form of enforcement priority,
and this Comment argues that noncitizens that are not a flight risk or a danger to the community should exist outside the ambit of that priority.
223
Shoba S. Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 64
AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1285 (2014).
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may be used at any stage of an immigration case.224
The legal authority for prosecutorial discretion can be found in the Take
Care Clause of Article II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution.225 The
Take Care Clause imposes a duty on the President to faithfully execute the
laws that are established by the legislative branch.226 In Heckler v. Chaney,
the Supreme Court made it clear that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute
or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally
committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”227
A review of U.S. immigration laws implemented by Congress confirms
that Congress has authorized DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion in regards to the implementation of immigration policy.228 This is most evident
in the Department of Homeland Security Act, which states that “[t]he Secretary of Homeland Security shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and
naturalization of aliens.”229 A memorandum by former INS Commissioner
Doris Meisnner, dated November 17, 2000, explains the broad application of
prosecutorial discretion:
In the immigration context, the term [prosecutorial discretion] applies not only to the
decision to issue, serve, or file a Notice to Appear (NTA), but also to a broad range of
other discretionary enforcement decisions, including among others: Focusing investigative resources on particular offenses or conduct; deciding whom to stop, question,
and arrest; maintaining an alien in custody; seeking expedited removal or other forms
of removal by means other than a removal proceeding; settling or dismissing a proceeding; granting deferred action or staying a final order; agreeing to voluntary departure,
withdrawal of an application for admission, or other action in lieu of removing the alien;
230
pursuing an appeal; and executing a removal order.

The purpose of prosecutorial discretion is both monetary and humanitarian.231 The government has limited resources to spend and therefore cannot assert the full scope of its enforcement authority and instead needs to
224
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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
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Wadhia, supra note 223, at 1296.
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8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1996).
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Shoba S. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN.
PUB. L.J. 243, 244–245 (2010); see also Marisa Bono, When a Rose is Not a Rose: DACA, the
DREAM Act, and the Need for More Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 40 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 193, 203 (“Executive administrators have exercised their discretion to grant deferred
action for two main purposes: first, to more efficiently allocate resources as a matter of ‘administrative convenience;’ and second, to recognize humanitarian considerations when removable would be unconscionable.”).
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Wadhia, supra note 230, at 244–245.
225

MEDRANO_PAGE PROOF

632

6/2/18 4:34 PM

PEGUERO MEDRANO

[Vol. 108

prioritize its focus.232 Furthermore, some individuals, because of their upstanding reputation in society, are not pursued as a “reward for their good
deeds and in part a judgment by society that some people are morally desirable and more likely to succeed in the future.”233 Another factor that has
prompted the use of prosecutorial discretion is the adoption of the IIRIRA in
1996. The 1996 IIRIRA changes to immigration policy, which, as described
above, expanded the list of offenses that could qualify as aggravated felonies
and adopted the mandatory detention of certain classes of noncitizens, “rendered the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the INS the only means for
averting the extreme hardship associated with certain deportation and/or removal cases.”234 Instead, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a
component of DHS that is primarily responsible for enforcing “federal laws
governing border control, customs, trade and immigration,” looks to the executive’s priorities regarding immigration policy to determine which groups
of noncitizens are an enforcement priority under the current administration.
The most widely recognized form of prosecutorial discretion is deferred
action, also called priority status.235 Put simply, “[d]eferred action is a more
formal way of exercising prosecutorial discretion.”236 While there is no statutory basis for deferred action,237 this type of prosecutorial discretion “enables the government to make a formal determination not to pursue removal
of an unqualified or unlawfully present individual for a specific period of
time, usually for extraordinary humanitarian or law enforcement purposes.”238
An example of deferred action is President Obama’s adoption of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program in 2012.239 DACA
232
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Id. at 245.
234
Id. at 253 (citing a letter written by Attorney General Robert Raben to Massachusetts
Congressmen Barney Frank).
235
Id. at 246.
236
Jessica Vaughan, What is Deferred Action?, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (June 15, 2012),
https://cis.org/Vaughan/What-Deferred-Action.
237
The Code of Federal Regulations describes deferred action as “an act of administrative
convenience to the government which gives some cases lower priority.” See 8 C.F.R.
§274a.12(c)(14).
238
Id.
239
See Remarks by the President on Immigration, WHITE HOUSE (June 15, 2012, 2:30
PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-presidentimmigration. It is important to note that on September 5, 2017, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security rescinded the June 12, 2012 memorandum establishing the DACA program. See
Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) from Elaine
C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, to James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizen and Immigration
Services, Et Al. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memo
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put forth a deferred action initiative by which unauthorized youth who grew
up in the United States and had other strong equities were eligible for a stay
of deportation.”240 President Obama’s focus “on humanitarian factors like
family relationships resembles how prosecutorial discretion, and deferred action in particular, has been applied historically.”241 Thus, in adopting DACA,
the Obama administration took major strides in broadening the protection of
noncitizens when they announced their decision to defer the deportation of
millions of noncitizens.242
It is important to note that prosecutorial discretion, including deferred
action, is not a new idea in the United States’ immigration policy.243 In fact,
prosecutorial discretion has played a major role in immigration enforcement
throughout our country’s history. For example,
[o]ne of the earliest documents used by the immigration agency . . . was an Operations
Instruction that allowed for ‘deferred action’ . . . for noncitizens who could show one
or more of the following factors: advanced or tender age; presence in the United States
for many years; need for treatment in the United States for a physical or mental condition; and adverse effect on family members in the United States as a result of deportation.” Furthermore, “by the time DACA came around, federal immigration agencies
244
had been using deferred action with the Supreme Court’s blessing for over 60 years.

2. Prosecutorial Discretion for Detained Noncitizens
Detained noncitizens should be given the opportunity to apply for prosecutorial discretion immediately after being detained pursuant to § 1226(c).
Prosecutorial discretion in the form of deferred action for detained noncitizens with strong equities is the type of enforcement priority that is consistent
with humanitarian and monetary theories of prosecutorial discretion and is
consistent with the use of prosecutorial discretion since the enactment of
IIRIRA.
First, there are many detained noncitizens who have compelling humanitarian factors. The Second Circuit in Lora explained that there are two types
randum-rescission-daca.
240
See generally Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of
Homeland Security on DACA to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border
Prot., Et Al. (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
241
See Wadhia, supra note 223, at 1301–02.
242
See Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration, WHITE
HOUSE (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:01 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/
remarks-president-address-nation-immigration.
243
See Wadhia, supra note 223, at 1293.
244
Bono, supra note 230, at 204.
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of noncitizens that § 1226(c) subjects to mandatory detention: (1) noncitizens
that “have criminal records. . . are dangerous[,] or have no ties to a community, and (2) “non-citizens who, for a variety of individualized reasons, are
not dangerous, have strong family and community ties, are not flight risks[,]
and may have meritorious defenses to deportation at such time as they are
able to present them.”245 Detainees in the latter category are not a danger to
society or a flight risk.246 Most of these detainees have not even committed
serious or violent offenses. Rather, most were detained for committing minor, nonviolent offenses but were subject to mandatory detention because of
the series of immigration enforcement policy changes made by the enactment
of the IIRIRA.247 Further, these detainees are generally upstanding members
of their communities who contribute to the economy and pay taxes.248 Detainees in this latter category are also likely to have meritorious defenses
against their continued detention if given the opportunity to present them,
which in turn makes it more that they will to return to defend their case.249
Second, there are compelling monetary reasons to provide prosecutorial
discretion to detained noncitizens with strong equities. The cost of detaining
noncitizens is very high,250 and reducing the number of detainees will allow
the government to spend more money on improving detention centers that
are in need of resources.251 This, in turn, will save taxpayers money and allow the government to focus on more serious crimes.252 Furthermore, the
costs of detention go far beyond what the government spends in detention
centers. A recent study that surveyed over 500 detained noncitizens who had
been detained for six months or more “found that long-‐term detention removed millions of dollars from local communities.”253 Approximately 90%
of the surveyed detainees were employed before being detained and had

245
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246

See supra Section III.A.

247

See supra Section I.B.
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Immigration Detention: How Can the Government Cut Costs?, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Mar.
31, 2013), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/uploads/pdfs/immigration-detention-fact-sheetjan-2013.pdf (describing that immigrant detention is costing taxpayers millions—in 2013
alone “the federal government spen[t] more than $5 million daily to detain immigrants).
251

See generally OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 218.
Wadhia, supra note 230, at 268 (“Like all law enforcement agencies, the INS has finite
resources, and it is not possible to investigate and prosecute all immigration violations . . . the
Service must make decisions about how best to expend its resources. Managers should plan
and design operations to maximize the likelihood that serious offenders will be identified.”).
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steady pre-detention earnings.254 Based on these earnings, the study found
that “the estimated lost wages for the sample due to detention was $43,357
per day.”255
3. Application and Risk Assessment Tools
Similar to other warrants for prosecutorial discretion, the application
would be sent to a local ICE office and reviewed by ICE officers to determine
if the positive factors in a noncitizen’s background make him or her a nonpriority for detention. If a noncitizen is granted prosecutorial discretion, the
detainee is released for the duration of their removal proceedings.
Officers that review applications for deferred action can use current risk
assessment tools to objectively determine whether an applicant should be
granted deferred action on their continued detention. For example, “the Office of Probation and Pretrial Services of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts has developed a risk assessment tool designed specifically for
federal pretrial defendants.”256 By using the Risk Prediction Index (RPI),
officers will be exposed to “valuable information for determining whether or
not an individual should be incarcerated until the trial or released, and if the
latter, whether the [noncitizen] should be required to post bond or be subject
to an alternative to detention.”257 This risk tool is particularly useful because
while it “incorporates information such as criminal history, demographics,
drug use, and residency, it intentionally does not give significant consideration to immigration status.”258
Furthermore, current Alternatives to Detention (ATD) programs can be
used to ensure that detention is a last resort.259 ICE has in place several ATD
programs, such as release on parole, check-in at ICE offices, home visits and
check-ins, telephonic monitoring, and in rare cases, GPS monitoring through
an electronic ankle bracelet.260 Prosecutorial discretion in conjunction with
the use of ATD programs protects both the detainee’s liberty interest and the
254

Id.

255

Id. at 4.
See generally Allyson Theophile, Pretrial Risk Assessment and Immigration Status: A
Precarious Intersection, 73 FED. PROBATION (Apr. 2007), available at https://mow.fd.org/
sites/mow.fd.org/files/training/2015_CLE_Detention_and_Release/Pretrial%20Risk%20Assessment%20and%20Immig
ration%20article.pdf.
257
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government’s interest in preventing flight and dangerousness.
There are many things that assuredly could go wrong with this proposal.
For instance, there is no way of ensuring that applicants are given the needed
assistance and resources to apply for release while detained, especially when
detention centers are presently having a difficult time providing detainees
with proper basic needs. To address this problem and other similar problems,
ICE should ensure that the application is available online, in hard copy at all
detention centers, and in multiple languages. Furthermore, ICE should be
required to provide detained noncitizens with information on how to apply
online as well as telephonic assistance and detailed instructions on paper hard
copies. All immigration detention centers should be informed that no detained noncitizen can be denied the liberty to apply. Finally, applicants
should also be afforded the opportunity to appeal a determination by ICE to
an independent board consisting of ICE officers located in another office.
Another problem that might arise from this proposal is the reality that
the current culture at ICE under today’s administration is one that is aggressive and unapologetic to noncitizens that violate immigration laws.261 ICE
officers might therefore abuse their discretion and deny prosecutorial discretion even to detained noncitizen that clearly qualify. To address this problem,
ICE officials should be required to attend training on how to use the risk
assessment tool in an objective manner. The training should be developed in
collaboration with nongovernmental organizations that are knowledgeable
about the effect mandatory detention has had on detainees and their families.
All officers should be required to make a decision within seventy-two hours
so as not to delay release. Also, adopting prosecutorial discretion for detained noncitizens can potentially shift the aggressive ICE culture that exists
under the current administration by exposing ICE officials to the positive
characteristics of detained noncitizens.
4. Six-Month Bond Hearing if Discretion is Denied
In the case that a detained noncitizen is denied prosecutorial discretion,
automatic periodic bond hearings beginning at six months should be required.
Six-month detention without bond at this point will no longer be unreasonable because detained noncitizens would have had the opportunity to apply for
prosecutorial discretion. Furthermore, requiring automatic bond hearings will
ensure that every detained noncitizen is given their day in court in the event
that their application for prosecutorial discretion is not granted.
261

John Burnett, Riding With ICE: ‘We Are Trying To Do The Right Thing,’ NPR (June 20,
2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/07/20/537894936/ice-not-apologizing-for-aggressive-tactics.
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CONCLUSION
Due to the current political climate regarding immigration law, the due
process rights of noncitizens have never been in such great jeopardy. This
risk is even more concerning for noncitizens who have committed a § 1226(c)
qualifying offense and are mandatorily detained. Due process is a right afforded to everyone, regardless of a person’s immigration status or previous
criminal record. Detained noncitizens are no exception to these rights, and
mandatory detention under § 1226(c), without any opportunity for bond during detention, is a violation of detained noncitizens’ constitutional rights to
liberty and due process. The circuit courts aptly read § 1226(c) to include a
time limitation against unreasonably prolonged detention. The approaches
adopted by these courts, however, incorrectly presumed that detention for at
least six months is reasonable and justified. As this Comment has shown,
detention for even six months is not reasonable or justified for many detained
noncitizens who have strong equities and can prove they are not dangerous
or a flight risk. As an alternative, this Comment proposed that detained
noncitizens should be afforded the opportunity to apply for prosecutorial discretion as to their continued detention at any point after being detained. If
granted, detained noncitizens are released for the duration of their removal
proceedings, and if denied, detained noncitizens are entitled to automatic and
periodic bond hearings after six months.
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